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Abstract
This note examines the potential output gains from the implementation of optimal
teacher incentive pay schemes, by calibrating the Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom (1987) hid-
den action model using data from Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), a teacher
incentive pay experiment implemented in Andhra Pradesh, India. Findings suggest
that the introduction of optimal individual incentive-pay schemes could result in very
large increases in output, about six times the size of the (significant) results obtained
in the experiment.
Keywords: hidden action, empirical contracts, teacher incentive pay
1 Introduction
Evidence that teacher quality is an important determinant of human capital that is hard to
measure (Goldhaber and Brewer (1997); Rivkin et al. (2005); Hanushek (2011)) has gener-
ated substantial policy interest in output-based teacher incentive schemes and motivated a
research agenda using randomized controlled trials to estimate whether such schemes affect
teacher inputs (see, e.g., Glewwe et al. (2010); Fryer Jr (2013)).
The importance of adopting teacher incentive pay depends on the potential gain from their
implementation, which can only be computed using optimal incentive schemes. Despite the
∗nirav.mehta@uwo.ca
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availability of high-quality experimental findings and a well-developed theoretical literature,
the gains from using optimal incentives are unknown for two reasons. First, characterizing
optimal contracts is technically very demanding in most economic environments. Further,
quantifying the effects of implementing such a contract would also require knowledge of the
model’s underlying parameters.
If output is a noisy measure of teacher effort then output-based incentives could be
suboptimally strong if, as incentive pay opponents argue, they expose teachers to too much
risk. Alternatively, they could be too weak if they do not appreciably change teacher effort
inputs, making it hard to discern significant effects. Theoretical work such as Barlevy and
Neal (2012), which takes the first step in a multitask model of teacher effort provision,
cannot quantify the gains from optimal contracts without taking the second step. At the
same time, cleanly identified and precisely estimated causal effects from RCTs cannot speak
to the gains from optimal incentives without the additional structure provided by theoretical
work. Moreover, since RCT implementation is expensive, experiments typically study only
a small number of different levels of incentive strength (i.e., treatment groups). Searching
for optimal incentive strength via pure experimentation would be prohibitively expensive,
motivating the use of additional structure to maximally leverage findings from RCTs for use
in education policy.
This paper takes a step towards filling this gap by using the framework of Ho¨lmstrom
and Milgrom (1987), a hidden action, or “moral hazard” model of effort choice, to interpret
findings from Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), an experimental study of teacher
incentive pay implemented in Andhra Pradesh, a state in India. In the model, teachers
choose an unobserved effort level, which determines their quality. The main advantage of
this model is its closed-form solution of the optimal contract: the optimal incentive scheme
is linear in output, which depends on teacher effort and a shock. A larger error variance or
higher teacher risk aversion would reduce optimal incentive strength, or slope of remuneration
in output. Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom (1987) is equivalent to the widely used CARA-Normal
model, making it a particularly salient example environment.
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) is particularly good for calibrating model pa-
rameters because the experiment introduced an output-based incentive scheme that, like the
optimal contract in Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom (1987), is linear in the output of individual
teachers. Additionally, the authors estimate a significant effect of individual incentive-pay
schemes. Because this paper’s goal is to assess potential gains from optimal contracts, it is
most natural to focus on a well-designed incentive pay experiment reporting a statistically
significant effect.
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2 Methods
2.1 Model
This section presents the workhorse CARA-Normal model of moral hazard, as developed in
Bolton and Dewatripont (2005). Although this model assumes a linear contract, which need
not be optimal, the solution is the same as that in Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom (1987), which
studies a static one-period model split into a number of sub-periods, where in each sub-period
an agent (i.e., teacher) controls the probability of success for a binomial random variable.
In particular, Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom (1987) show that the optimal contract features an
end-of-period payment that is a linear function of aggregated signals. The interpretation for
our education context would be that, in each infinitesimal unit of time, the teacher could
exert more or less effort to increase the probability a student obtains a sub-period-specific
“bit” of human capital measured by an end-of-year exam.
The administrator has utility q − w, where q is output and w is the wage paid to the
teacher. The teacher has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility −e−ξ(w−ψ(a)), where
ξ is their coefficient of absolute risk-aversion and the cost of exerting effort a is ψ(a) = γa2/2.
The teacher requires an expected utility of u to participate. Output from teacher i depends
on their effort according to qi = ai + ηi, where the IID ex-post shock ηi ∼ N
(
0, σ2η
)
renders
output a noisy measure of teacher effort.
Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom (1987) show that it is optimal for the administrator to pay the
teacher using the linear contract w = β0 + β1q, where β1 is the share of output paid to the
teacher. Therefore, the administrator solves
max
β0,β1
Eη [a+ η − w(a, η)] (1)
s.t. w(a, η) = β0 + β1(a+ η)
Eη
[−e−ξ(w(a,η)−ψ(a))] ≥ u (IR)
a ∈ arg max Eη
[−e−ξ(w(a,η)−ψ(a))] . (IC)
The teacher problem yields a unique optimal effort level a∗ = β1/γ by differentiating (IC)
with respect to effort, and the optimal linear contract sets β∗1 = 1/(1 + ξγσ
2
η). Therefore,
expected output is E [q∗] = Eη [a∗ + η] = a∗ = 1/
(
γ(1 + ξγσ2η)
)
. Intuitively, as the signal
quality worsens (i.e., σ2η increases) the contract becomes lower powered (i.e., β
∗
1 decreases),
resulting in lower effort a∗ and expected output E [q∗].
If noise increased, the resulting optimal contract would partially protect a risk-averse
teacher by making incentives weaker in output, by reducing the slope of the linear contract
3
β∗1 . The more risk-averse the teacher, the more protected they would be from fluctuations
in η.
2.2 Calibration
I calibrate the model parameters (γ, ξ, σ2η) using a “sophisticated” back-of-the-envelope
method, which is “sophisticated” because I calibrate using equilibrium implications of the
hidden action model. As I show below, values for ξ and σ2η can be obtained either directly
from external sources or by transforming external data. However, to calibrate the effort cost
parameter γ, we need to know how much teachers respond to incentive pay. Note that the
“causal” or composite effect of teacher incentive pay reported in the experimental results
could, in theory, also include changes in student and/or family inputs. However, assigning
the total effect to changes in teacher effort is consistent with the theoretical model used to
interpret these results. Note that effort and output are compared to their baseline levels,
i.e., that obtained absent output-based incentives.
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) estimate the effect of an output-based incentive
scheme for teachers in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, in which teachers were paid
according to a linear schedule, 500 rupees per percent increase in mean test scores, for test
score gains above 5%. The study covered two years. As with any mapping between theory
and data, assumptions have to be made. The benefit of using Ho¨lmstrom and Milgrom (1987)
to interpret Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) is that the linear scheme employed in
the latter affords a clean mapping between their findings and the hidden action model. The
same is true of their experimental research design, which obviates having to account for
mean differences in output between treatment and control groups being based on selection
on hidden types, allowing the calibration to proceed for a representative (average) teacher.1
I convert currency into U.S. dollars for convenience. While this might raise concerns about
external validity, CARA utility implies that risk aversion is independent of wealth, meaning
the large wealth differences between teachers in India and the U.S. would only affect the
intercept, not optimal teacher effort and output.
There were on average 3.14 teachers and 37.5 pupils per teacher in the incentive schools.
Student achievement increased by an average of 0.15 sd, per year. Students’ annual wages
increased by an average of 2,156 rupees per student2; the average cost of the incentive
scheme was 20,000 rupees.3 With a conversion rate of 45 rupees per dollar, this corresponds
1The linearity of the administrator’s objective implies that she can solve a separate problem for each
teacher.
2See footnote 34 on page 72 of Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011).
3The incentive scheme cost an average of 10,000 rupees for each of two years.
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to $1,796.67 (=$47.91×37.5) in total output produced by the average teacher and $141.54
(=$444.44/3.14) paid to the average teacher. Then, the slope of the contract is the per-
teacher income increase ($141.54) divided by the increase in output ($1,796.67), or 0.0788;
i.e., teachers were paid a piece rate of 7.88% of output.
We can exploit the teacher’s optimal choice of action, which solves (IC) in (1) but does
not rely on optimality of the slope β1, to map (β1, a) to the effort cost γ. The value of γ
which rationalizes this increase is then γ = β1/a = 0.0788/1, 796.67 = 4.385× 10−5. Teacher
risk aversion matters for how incentives are structured (Nadler and Wiswall (2011)). I set
the CARA parameter to ξ = 6.7× 10−3, the mean estimated CARA from the benchmark
model of Cohen and Einav (2007), Table 5. This is likely conservative, as Dohmen and Falk
(2010) document that teachers are more risk-averse than other workers.
Assuming mean test scores4 y are converted to output via q = βqy, the conversion
factor βq can be calibrated by noting that the scheme increased mean test scores by 0.15
sd and output per teacher by $1,796.67, resulting in a conversion factor βq =$11,977.78
(=$1,796.67/0.15). Student j’s test score depends on their teacher i’s effort and a student-
specific shock distributed IID according to ji ∼ N (0, σ2 ), which captures idiosyncratic
factors affecting student achievement on the administered test instrument. The variance of
the mean test score then can be computed by dividing the variance of test score error σ2 by
the average number of students per teacher in the data, i.e., σ2y =0.953/(37.5).
5 To obtain
the variance of output σ2η we then square the test-score-to-income parameter and multiply
by the variance of mean test score, i.e., σ2η =6,076,631$
2(=$11,977.782 × 0.953/(37.5)).6
3 Results
Using the calibrated parameter values, we can solve for the optimal slope of β∗1 = 0.483,
which is over six times steeper than in the experiment. This results in an optimal effort
level/output gain of a∗ = $11, 011.34, which corresponds to an average increase in student
achievement of 0.919 sd. Accordingly, these increases are also more than six times larger
than the estimated increases stemming from the much weaker incentives provided under the
experiment.
4Note that everywhere, I refer to test score gains.
5Schochet and Chiang (2012) compile estimates of the variances from a large number of studies in their
study of error rates in value-added models, providing a good source for typical values for σ2 of σ
2
 = 0.953.
Results available upon request.
6This is because the variance of q, i.e., σ2η, is β
2
qσ
2
y.
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Sensitivity Analysis Figure 1 presents contour maps of model outcomes for a grid of
points covering a wide range of alternative values of σ2η and ξ, ranging from one half to ten
times the calibrated value of each parameter.7 Note that, because γ was recovered using the
teacher’s effort action choice and can be recovered by using the slope of incentives in the
experiment and increase in output, it does not depend on (σ2η, ξ). Figure 1a is a contour
map of the optimal output share, or β∗1 . Figure 1b is a contour map of optimal output,
i.e., E [q∗]. In both figures, the value corresponding to the calibrated values of σ2η and ξ is
indicated by a red dot. We can see that as teachers become more risk averse (increasing ξ)
or output becomes noisier (increasing σ2η), both incentive strength (Figure 1a) and output
gains decrease (Figure 1b). For example, the increase in output ranges from about 1.5 sd in
student achievement (at the bottom-left) to around 0.5 sd when teachers are ten times more
risk averse than their calibrated value of ξ = 6.7e− 3. This latter figure is only about three
times the estimated effect of the incentive scheme, but still of considerable magnitude when
compared with the effects of other educational interventions, while not being implausibly
large.8 Put another way, teachers would have to be extremely risk averse and/or output
would have to be far noisier than typical test instruments to have optimal incentives be even
close to as flat as those implemented in Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011).
Finally, Figure 1c presents a contour map of the expected share of teacher income com-
prised by variable compensation, i.e., E [β∗1q
∗] /E [β∗0 + β
∗
1q
∗]. As with the slope and output,
this share declines as the output shock variance and degree of risk aversion increase.9 The
optimal expected share of income that is variable pay under the calibrated parameter values
would be around 7%.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper produces the first assessment of the potential gains to implementing optimal
teacher incentive pay. The findings point to large potential gains to implementing optimal
contracts, which are six times steeper than those in the experiment. This finding suggests
that the estimated null effect found in many implemented studies of incentive pay (see, e.g.,
Glewwe et al. (2010) and Fryer Jr (2013)) could potentially be attributed to weaker-than-
optimal incentive strength.
The simplicity of this paper’s approach allows me to study an environment for which the
optimal contract has already been characterized and then use a well-implemented empirical
7Table 2 in Babcock et al. (1993) shows that a higher-end estimate of ξ is about 0.35, well above the
range considered in the parameter grid here.
8Cohen (1988) classifies gains of 0.80sd and higher as “large”.
9This was computed using a certainty equivalent value of $70,000 (Himes (2015)).
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Figure 1: Optimal output share and ratio of output for (σ2η, ξ)−grid
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(c) Variable share of income,
E [β∗1q∗] /E [β∗0 + β∗1q∗]
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study to recover the relevant parameters. It provides an example of the potential gains
to adopting optimal contracts in educational production. Calculating the potential output
gains from moving to optimal contracts in other hidden action environments (e.g., Imberman
and Lovenheim (2015)) constitutes an important avenue for future research.
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